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1. Introduction 
In most financial frauds, a company tries to make its performance appear better than it 
really is, hoping to achieve a valuation that wouldn’t be supported by its true cash flows.  This 
paper looks at the opposite case.  We investigate the disclosure and governance practices of 
more than 200 U.S. companies accused by government authorities of participating in price-
fixing cartels.  These firms earn strong cash flows, and continuation of their schemes requires 
obfuscation of the windfalls from regulators, analysts, customers, and at times, even their own 
boards of directors. 
Connor and Helmers (2007) define a cartel as “an association of legally independent 
firms that aims to raise their joint profits through explicit agreements. Hard-core cartels aim to 
control prices or restrict supply (or both).”  Decisions to join cartels are typically taken by a 
firm’s very top managers and then implemented by the intermediate management (Harrington, 
2006).  The role of top management suggests that corporate governance may affect formation 
and continuation of a cartel.  For example, cartels may occur more readily in firms with a high 
concentration of power at the top level, a weak or inattentive board of directors, or strong pay-
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for-performance incentives (Spagnolo, 2005).1  In addition, financial reporting strategies that 
cause signal-jamming, such as earnings smoothing and suspicious accrual patterns, might be 
expected to occur frequently with cartels.  Cartelists have an ongoing need to deter both 
cheating and the entry into the industry of new firms (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006).  If a cartel 
member deviates from a collusive agreement, its sudden jump in earnings might be detected by 
co-conspirators, who could start a price war that could destroy the cartel.  Therefore, we would 
expect cartels to use financial reporting strategies that obscure year-to-year swings in 
profitability. 
This paper investigates how cartel firms attempt to cover up their conspiracies.  We use 
an empirical framework similar to that of Kedia and Philippon (2009), who investigate cover-
up actions by firms involved in fraudulent accounting.  We study a sample of 1,561 firm-years 
from 216 U.S. companies participating in hard-core cartels between 1986 and 2010.  We define 
a cartel firm-year as year in which the given cartelist has been involved in price fixing.  The 
starting point and duration of the cartels in our sample are identified by enforcement actions 
brought by government antitrust authorities.  We compare these cartel firm-year observations to 
observations from a set of control firms matched on size and industry.  As in other empirical 
studies on cartels, our sample is subject to a selection bias as we are only able to consider 
discovered and indicted cartels, which are believed to represent on a minority of the price-
fixing conspiracies that occur worldwide (see Connor, 2010). 
                                                           
1 Theoretical research shows that cartel formation may be motivated not only by the potential profits from price-
fixing, but also by management incentives (e.g., Levenstein and Suslow, 2006).  Spagnolo (2005) adds managerial 
incentives schemes to a supergame-theoretic model of dynamic competition and shows that when managers have a 
preference for smooth time paths, collusion with other firms becomes more likely.  This could be caused by 
management bonus contracts that have capped incentive provisions.  His model shows that even though income 
smoothing is costly, shareholders tolerate the cost in return for the higher collusive profits.  Buccirossi and 
Spagnolo (2008) show in a classical model of repeated oligopoly that the stability of tacit collusive agreements is 
positively correlated with performance-based incentives provided to top management. 
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We document a range of accounting and governance strategies that cartel firms adopt in 
systematic patterns, apparently with an eye toward prolonging their conspiracies and evading 
legal liability.  To mislead readers of financial statements, companies engage in earnings 
smoothing and frequently reclassify the industrial segments for which they report line-of-
business results.  They file abnormally large numbers of financial restatements.  In corporate 
governance, cartel firms favor outside directors who are likely to be inattentive monitors due to 
their status as foreign or “busy” (belonging to a large number of boards).  When directors 
resign, they are often not replaced, and new auditing firms are engaged significantly less often 
than expected.  Cartel managers exercise their stock options faster than managers of other 
firms.  While our results are based only upon firms engaged in price fixing, we expect that they 
should apply generally to all companies in which the managers seek to conceal poor 
performance or personal wrongdoing. 
As an example, the pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. is one the more 
prominent firms in our sample.  It was charged with participating in cartels in three different 
countries between 1998 and 2005.  During this cartel period, Bristol-Myers engaged in many of 
the practices described in our analysis below.  The company reclassified its line-of-business 
segments nearly every year, constantly reorganizing them into different subcategories and at 
one point eliminating them altogether for a two-year period.  Five years’ of earnings results 
were restated, including two years that were restated twice.  The company was sued twice 
during this period for securities fraud.  It retained the same auditing firm for the entire cartel 
period despite the outward signs of financial reporting problems.  Three new outside directors 
joined the Bristol-Myers board between 1998-2005.  All three fell into the “busy” category, 
with three or more board memberships, and one of the three was based in a foreign country.  
Five of the incumbent outside directors from the start of the cartel period also had busy status.  
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At the end of its cartel period in 2006, after pleading guilty to federal criminal charges related 
to one cartel, Bristol-Myers appears to have undergone a governance and financial reporting 
overhaul.  It changed auditors, replacing PricewaterhouseCoopers with Deloitte & Touche, and 
added a law-and-order independent outsider to its board, the former FBI Director and federal 
judge Louis Freeh.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and 
variables. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Sample selection 
2.1 Cartel firms 
We use the U.S. firms included in an extended version of Connor’s (2010) hand 
collected Private International Cartel dataset, which covers private cartels discovered, disclosed 
and sanctioned by regulators around the world between January 1986 and December 2010.2  
The dataset omits cartels protected by sovereignty or multilateral treaties, as well as those for 
which no sanctions were imposed within five years of the authorities’ discovery.  A total of 648 
cartels involving 2,115 companies appear in the dataset, although in certain cases many more 
firms are sanctioned anonymously.  Many companies are repeat offenders and participate in 
multiple cartels.  The median cartel involves eight companies and lasts five years before 
discovery by regulators; the maximum values are considerably higher, with some cartels lasting 
for decades and involving dozens of companies or more.3 
The dataset includes each firm’s name, country of incorporation, the market(s) and 
continent(s) where collusion took place, the duration of the collusive agreement, and if known, 
                                                           
2
 The dataset in Connor (2010) covers the time period from January 1990 to December 2009. 
 
3
 Connor (2010) reports one case of more than 2,000 unnamed construction companies accused of price fixing by 
authorities in the Netherlands. 
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the fines imposed, leniency granted by regulators, and estimated overcharges to consumers.  
Information is collected mainly from filings, documents, reports, and press releases from the 
antitrust authorities in different countries, as well as newspaper and magazine articles retrieved 
through search engines like Factiva or Lexis-Nexis.  The sample generally includes more 
observations in recent years, with between 300 and 400 companies in each of the years 2005-
2009.  We do not know whether this pattern occurs due to better enforcement, more disclosure 
by regulators, more coverage by the press, or a greater tendency by companies to collude in 
price fixing or bid rigging, though Connor and Helmers (2007) estimate that only 10% to 30% 
of all price-fixing conspiracies are ever discovered.  European companies comprise the 
majority of observations in the dataset, although many cartels are global in nature and involve 
multinational firms operating on several continents.  Connor and Helmers (2007) estimate that 
by the early 2000s, worldwide corporate penalties for firms participating in cartels stabilized at 
or above $2 billion per year, with approximately 60% due to government fines (mainly from 
U.S. and European regulators) and 40% paid to settle private litigation. 
To select our sample, we begin with 819 U.S. companies included in the international 
dataset.  We exclude all cartels which started before 1986 and all firms not covered by 
Compustat, which substantially reduces the sample size to 216 firms that are involved in a total 
of 382 conspiracies.  We obtain data for 1,561 cartel company-year observations (including 
part-years) for these 216 firms over the 1986-2010 period, with 67 of the 216 companies 
participating in more than one cartel.  The mean and median cartel period is six years for our 
sample, and the maximum value is 22 years for a marine hose cartel involving the rubber 
manufacturers Goodyear and Parker Hannifin.  ExxonMobil is involved in 13 individual 
cartels, the most of any company in the sample, followed by Johnson & Johnson with nine. 
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We augment the financial statement data from Compustat for our 216 firms with 
information from other financial and governance sources, including the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) stock price database, the RiskMetrics Governance and Directors 
databases, Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database, and the AuditAnalytics database.  
Missing values in these datasets reduce the observations available for some of our analysis 
below. 
Figure 1 displays the mean and median ROA for our sample companies over a 
symmetric window of three years around the starting point of each cartel.  ROA is calculated 
throughout the paper as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  
Figure 1, which provides a reality check on the accuracy of regulators’ identification of the 
cartels, shows that profitability decreases until the last year before a firm enters into a cartel, 
and then increases steadily over the subsequent four years, beginning in year 0, the first cartel 
year. 
In our regression analysis below, we generally pool together the 1,561 cartel-firm 
observations with the much larger control sample of 53,418 observations described below, and 
we test the significance of an indicator variable for the cartel firm-year observations.  However, 
the boundaries of our cartel-firm sample rely on governments’ identification of the exact cartel 
periods.  Because the start and end dates of a cartel may be quite ambiguous (even to the firms 
themselves), we also estimate all of our models including every Compustat firm-year that is 
available for our cartel firms.  We find almost no difference in our regression estimates, and 
with the exception of financial restatements, no difference in the cartel firms’ behavior 
compared to the control sample for any of our dependent variables.  Therefore, we do not report 
the alternate set of results. 
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2.2. Control sample of matched firms 
We construct a control sample of comparable companies following the approach used in 
Kedia and Philippon’s (2009) study of financial fraud.  For every cartelist, we create a group of 
non-cartelists including all companies that operate in the same two-digit SIC industry and are 
located in the same total assets quintile of Compustat in the year before each collusive 
agreement starts.  If a conspiracy was already active in 1986, the beginning of our sample 
period, we use the first cartel firm-year in our sample to form the corresponding control group.  
No cartel firm is permitted also to enter the control sample.   
Our final sample includes 1,561 cartel firm-years for 216 offending companies and a 
control group of 53,418 firm-years for 3,511 companies matched on size and industry.  Table 1 
presents summary statistics comparing the means and standard deviations across these two 
subsamples for all the variables used in our analysis below.  The table shows that cartel firms 
are larger and more profitable than their counterparts in the control sample, and they also 
exhibit sharply higher rates of accounting problems such as restatements, securities fraud 
litigation, and discretionary accruals. Cartelists often are the largest firms in their industries, 
which seems logical since substantial market power would be required to fix prices 
successfully.  Due to this pattern, we use the natural log of total assets as a control variable in 
all of our regressions. 
 Table 2 studies the growth of important financial variables for cartel firms compared to 
the control group.  We use the methods in Kedia and Philippon’s (2009) study of firms 
committing financial fraud, regressing the growth rates of different quantities against indicator 
variables that equal one for three periods that we label Before, During, and After.  The Before 
variable equals 1 in the two years prior to initiation of a cartel, the During variable equals 1 
while the cartel is active, and the After variable equals 1 for the two years subsequent to the 
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cartel.  We estimate ordinary least squares panel regressions in which the dependent variable 
equals the change in growth rates of variables such as sales, from which we subtract the mean 
change in growth rates for the same variable in the control group of each cartel.  We winsorize 
all these relative growth variables to limits of -1 and 1.  We delete observations for which ROA 
exceeds 10 or is less than -10.  To control for the dependence of the disturbance terms, we 
calculate standard errors using the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich 
estimator. 
 Results in Table 2 show that cartel firms thrive as a result of their conspiracies, as 
estimates for the During variable indicate that sales grow 4.6% faster, return on assets grows 
0.4% faster, and market capitalization rises 3.6% faster than the comparable growth rates for 
the control sample.  These results are all significant at conventional levels and are generally 
close to zero and insignificant during both the Before or After years.  Cartel firms seem to 
respond to their strong profits by hiring more workers and increasing their bases of fixed assets, 
as we also observe significant growth in both employment and property, plant and equipment.  
The bottom rows of the table report Wald F-tests for differences in coefficient estimates for 
each variable in the Before vs. During subperiods as well as During vs. After.  The majority of 
these estimates are significant at conventional levels, and most of the others come close. 
 It is not clear why firms would systematically expand employment and fixed assets 
during the cartel period, especially since price-fixing strategies often involve restriction of 
output to maintain high prices.  Many cartel firms agree either explicitly or implicitly not to 
encroach upon the market shares of rivals.  These firms may expand to create a diversion for 
regulators, in line with many of the results found below, or they may use their cash flows to 
enter other lines of business as part of an empire building strategy, rather than returning the 
profits to stockholders. 
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3. Empirical results 
We study the behavior of cartel firms in two broad areas: corporate governance and 
financial reporting.  Our analysis in each subsection below investigates a variety of strategies 
that these firms may use to evade scrutiny from internal and external monitors, including 
changes in board composition, changes in auditors, and various financial reporting strategies 
such as restatements and earnings smoothing.  We also investigate top managers’ exercises of 
stock options and the frequency with which cartel firms become targets of class action 
shareholder litigation for securities fraud. 
 
3.1 Director turnover and replacement 
A company could participate in a cartel either with or without the knowledge of its 
board of directors, and for research purposes it may be difficult to predict which types of 
boards are more likely to be associated with collusive behavior.  However, we can make more 
straightforward predictions about changes in the board.  Companies should be reluctant to 
replace directors who resign or retire, because recruiting a new monitor from outside the 
company creates a risk of the cartel being exposed or halted. 
Table 3 presents an analysis of board turnover and changes in board size for our cartel 
firms compared to companies in the control sample.  We collect data on individual directors 
from the RiskMetrics database, and the limited coverage of this source causes a large reduction 
in our sample size.  Our regressions include control variables for board size, Tobin’s Q, the 
growth rate of ROA, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects.  As an alternative 
specification, we drop the year fixed effects in columns 2 and 4 and instead use an indicator 
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variable that equals one beginning in 2002, the first-year in which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
other regulations required companies to begin implementing changes in board structure. 
Table 3 shows two clear patterns.  Directors resign or retire more frequently in cartel 
firms compared to companies in the control sample, and when they leave, cartel firms are more 
likely to allow the board to shrink rather than replacing them.  Reasons for director resignations 
are not clear, but one clear possibility is that board members who become aware of wrongdoing 
leave quietly to evade future legal liability or to signal disagreement with management’s 
actions (see Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2012).  The motive for cartel firms not to replace 
exiting directors seems more clear: by leaving a board seat vacant, the company avoids the 
possibility of being monitored by a new individual from outside the firm. 
Table 4 analyzes the roles of busy and foreign directors on the boards of cartel firms 
compared to companies in the control sample.  Both of these types of directors have been 
shown in recent papers to perform poorly as monitors, due to such factors as distraction, 
distance, and their unfamiliarity with U.S. accounting rules.  Busy directors, defined as those 
serving on three or more boards simultaneously, are studied by Fich and Shivdasani (2006). 
Foreign independent directors are the subject of a recent paper by Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2012), who kindly shared their sample with us for use in this study.  Estimates in Table 4 
indicate that cartel firms have a greater proportion of busy outside directors than usual, and are 
also more likely to have at least one foreign outside director, compared to companies in the 
control sample.  When appointing new directors, cartels are more likely to select busy 
outsiders, consistent with a conjecture that management nominates new board members who 
are unlikely to monitor aggressively.  All of these results hold in models with controls for board 
size, profitability, board independence, and year and industry fixed effects. 
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3.2 Changes in auditors 
We investigate cartel firms’ changes in auditors to explore whether a pattern exists 
similar to that for boards of directors, with management exhibiting reluctance to bring in new 
outsiders who might monitor aggressively and become aware of the firm’s illegal conduct.  We 
use Compustat to identify changes in auditors and create an indicator variable that equals one 
for years in which the database reports a different auditor than the previous year.  A limited 
number of auditing firms exit the industry due to mergers or liquidation (including, most 
famously, Arthur Andersen).  In these cases, when an auditor change is mandatory and beyond 
the control of the firm, we set the auditor change indicator equal to missing. 
Summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that auditor changes occur far less frequently for 
cartel firms than for companies in the control sample, with annual frequencies of 3.3% vs. 
6.2%, respectively.  In Table 5 we report estimates for probit regressions in which the auditor 
change indicator is regressed against the cartel indicator as well as control variables for firm 
size and profitability; these controls are used because larger firms are known to change auditors 
less often than smaller ones, and successful firms are also likely to change less often than 
unsuccessful ones for whom audit conflicts may occur with greater frequency.  We include year 
fixed effects in the model on the left side of the table, and both year and industry fixed effects 
in the model shown on the right side. 
Estimates for the cartel firm indicator confirm the results found in the simple 
comparison of sample means: cartel firms change auditors significantly less often than other 
companies, controlling for company size, performance, industry membership, and time period.  
The results are consistent with those found above documenting unusually slow replacement of 
directors for cartel companies, and they suggest that management attempts to reduce external 
scrutiny by restricting access by new monitors. 
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3.3 Accounting restatements 
We investigate the propensity of cartel firms to engage in misleading financial reporting 
by analyzing their patterns of financial restatements.  We use the Audit Analytics database to 
download information about restatements filed by all of our sample firms between 2000 and 
2010.  The database covers restatements filed electronically with the SEC since January 1, 
2001, including restatements for past years filed since that date.  We exclude years earlier than 
2000, because the database’s coverage of their entire restatement history is likely to be 
incomplete. 
Table 6 presents our regression analysis of restatements for cartel firms and the matched 
sample.  In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether a fiscal 
year’s results are eventually restated.  These models are estimated in a probit framework, and 
column 2’s specification includes industry and year fixed effects.  In columns 3 and 4, the 
dependent variable is the number of times that a given year’s results are restated, with the 
models estimated in a Poisson maximum likelihood framework.  The control variables in all 
models follow those used by Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).  They include the book-to-
market ratio of common equity lagged one year, the log of the market value of equity lagged 
one year, a measure of external financing equal to net equity plus net debt issued deflated by 
the lagged market value of equity, acquisition spending over the lagged market value of equity, 
and a measure of free cash flow calculated as the difference of operating cash flow and average 
capital expenditure over the three prior years, deflated by lagged market value of equity.  All 
control variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 
 Consistent with the summary statistics in Table 1 showing a 50% higher incidence of 
restatements among cartel firms, the estimates for the cartel firm indicator are positive in every 
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column and significant in three columns out of four, with the fourth result just falling short of 
the 10% threshold.  The evidence shows that cartel firms are more likely to file restatements 
than firms in the control sample, consistent with a strategy of using misleading accounting in 
order to conceal the firm’s true operating performance. 
 We analyze our results further in regressions similar to those in Table 2, with Before, 
During, and After indicator variables for the cartel companies.  While cartel firms are 
significantly more likely than other firms to file financial restatements during the years in 
which the government accuses them of price-fixing behavior (the During years), they are 
significantly less likely than other firms to have restatements for those years either before or 
after the cartel period.  This pattern indicates an interesting coincidence between government 
enforcement actions and firms’ subsequent restatements.  It is also unique in our set of 
dependent variables.  We investigate the Before-During-After structure of indicator variables 
for all of our other analysis such as board changes and earnings management, and cartel firms’ 
behavior in all other areas seems to persist for long periods that extend beyond the precise 
period in which the firm becomes targeted for enforcement. 
 
3.4 Earnings management 
We expect cartel firms to engage in abnormally high levels of accounting earnings 
management.  This strategy might serve either of two purposes: it could conceal the firm’s 
rising profits from regulators and analysts, and it may signal to competing firms a desire to 
promote stable profits in the industry.  We investigate two strategies for earnings management, 
the manipulation of discretionary accruals and deferred revenue. 
Our study of discretionary accruals follows the approach of Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) and Klein (2002). We estimate a firm’s discretionary accruals with a version of the 
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Jones (1991) and modified Jones (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) models, which estimate 
nondiscretionary accruals as the fitted value from a regression. Discretionary accruals are then 
calculated as the residual difference of total accruals less nondiscretionary accruals. 
Our methodology uses annual data from Compustat to calculate total accruals for firm i 
in year t as: 
( )
1−
− − + −
=
i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
i ,t
i ,t
∆CA ∆CL ∆Cash ∆STD Dep
TA
A
 (1) 
 
where 
∆CA = the change in current assets 
∆CL = the change in current liabilities 
∆Cash = the change in cash holdings 
∆STD = the change in long term debt in current liabilities 
∆Dep = the depreciation and amortization expense of the firm 
∆A = firm size (in assets) 
We follow Klein (2002) by estimating expected accruals at the industry level by fitting 
the following regression each year across all Compustat firms in each two-digit SIC industry: 
0 1 2 3
1
1
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   (2) 
where ∆Rev  is the change in sales and PPE is gross property, plant and equipment, both 
deflated by lagged assets.  We require a minimum of 12 observations per regression. 
Nondisicretionary accruals are then calculated for every firm-year observation as: 
0 1 2 3
1
1
i ,t i ,t i ,t
i ,t
NDA α α α ∆Rev α PPE
A
−
= + ∗ + ∗ + ∗% % % %
 (3) 
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where 0 1 2% % %α , α , α  are the estimated parameters from equation (2).  This leads to the calculation 
of discretionary accruals: 
= −i ,t i ,t i ,tDA TA NDA    (4) 
As an alternative, we use the modified Jones model.  Instead of deriving the fitted 
values used to calculate NDA in equation (3) from the regression in equation (2), we estimate 
the following regression which substitutes the change in sales less the change in receivables for 
the change in sales, i.e., 
( )0 1 2 3
1
1
i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t
i ,t
TA α α α ∆Rev ∆Rec α PPE ε
A
−
= + ∗ + ∗ − + ∗ +
   (5)  
where ∆Rec  is the change in receivables deflated by lagged assets. 
In Table 7 we present least-squares estimates of discretionary accruals for our cartel 
firms and the control sample.  Other explanatory variables, following Klein (2002) and 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), include firm size (the log of total assets), leverage, Tobin’s 
Q, the absolute value of the change in return on assets, and the natural log of firm age (based on 
the company’s first inclusion in the CRSP database).  Both models include year and industry 
fixed effects.  Estimates in the left two columns of Table 7 are positive and significant for the 
cartel firm indicator using either of the dependent variables for discretionary accruals.  This 
indicates that cartel firms are more aggressive about using accruals. 
 Table 7 continues with two regressions estimating cartel firms’ propensity to record 
deferred revenue, an accounting entry that essentially pushes profits into a future period by 
balancing an increase in cash received with an entry on the liability side of the balance sheet; 
the liability is then converted into shareholders’ equity, an act that increases the firm’s profits, 
during the future period when the income is deemed to be earned.  We calculate deferred 
revenue as the sum of the Compustat variables DRC (revenue that has not been earned but is 
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expected to be recognized in the current year) and DRLT (revenue that has not been earned and 
will be recognized in more than one year). 
 We present a Tobit analysis in column 3 of Table 7, with the dependent variable equal 
to deferred revenue scaled by net sales.  In column 4, we estimate a binary probit model in 
which the dependent variable equals one if the firm has positive deferred revenue on its balance 
sheet in that year.  We use the same explanatory variables that appear in our models of 
discretionary accruals.  For either model, the estimate for the cartel firm indicator is negative 
and significant.  The result is quite similar to that found for discretionary accruals, implying 
that cartel firms tend to report higher earnings in current periods.  Interpreting these results is 
somewhat challenging.  Our main thesis in this paper is that cartel firms actively try to conceal 
the extent of their success in order to prolong the benefits from collusion.  This might suggest 
less aggressive earnings management and slower revenue recognition, but we find the opposite.  
This may occur for a number of reasons.  Cartel firms may expect profits to rise in the future 
and see little need for establishing accounting reserves and delaying revenue recognition.  
Alternatively, cartelists may feel vulnerable to outside scrutiny if revenue deferrals and slow 
accruals lead to an overwhelming delay of profit reporting, and they may make no effort to 
delay favorable accounting news in order to keep the pipeline clear of future positive news that 
could raise a red flag for regulators. 
 
3.5 Segment reclassification 
Diversified companies are required to report line-of-business financial data in industry 
segments, providing information about key aggregates such as sales, operating profit, capital 
spending, and assets invested.  However, companies have discretion to use their own judgment 
when setting the boundaries between their business entities.  The financial statements of major 
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conglomerates routinely exhibit year-to-year changes in the number and relative size of 
business segments.  These could occur due to acquisitions and divestitures, changes in 
operating performance, or accounting decisions made by management.  Regardless of the 
motivation for segment reclassifications, they tend to obscure the clarity of a firm’s financial 
results by making year-over-year performance comparisons difficult. 
  We study the extent to which the cartel firms in our sample reclassify their industrial 
segments on a year-to-year basis, since these accounting adjustments represent a further 
strategy for concealing the firm’s financial results from external audiences.  For our cartel firms 
and the control sample, we study annual changes in the intra-firm Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
as a way to infer segment reclassifications.  We construct the index for each firm-year using 
data from the Compustat Segments database.  We use total assets as a measure of the size of 
each industrial segment.  The Herfindahal Hirschman Index is computed as the sum of the 
squares of each segment’s assets as a proportion of the square of total assets for the company. 
For example, if a firm has only one segment, its index equals 1.0, and if it has 10 segments that 
each contribute 10% of its assets, its index equals 0.1. Hence, the index’s value decreases as the 
degree of diversification increases. 
 In Table 8 we report results from regression estimations in which the dependent variable 
equals the absolute value of the annual change in the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index.  We use 
the absolute value because we are concerned only with whether cartel firms adjust the relative 
sizes of their reporting segments on a year-to-year basis, rather than whether they increase or 
decrease their degree of diversification.  As control variables, the model includes a 
specification based on Berger and Ofek’s (1995) study that used segment financial data to 
calculate value losses from diversification, including the log of total assets, ROA (EBIT over 
total assets), and capital spending (CAPX over total assets).  Year fixed effects are included in 
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both columns of the table, and the second column also includes industry fixed effects.  We use 
a Tobit specification since the absolute value of the dependent variable is left-censored at zero. 
Results shown in Table 8 indicate that cartel firms change the distribution of assets 
across segments more than matched control firms, as the cartel indicator variable has a positive 
and significant estimate of approximately 0.12 in both models.  These estimates confirm our 
hypothesis that frequent segment reclassification helps these companies diminish the clarity of 
their performance by making more difficult year-over-year comparisons at the industry level. 
 
3.6 Mangers’ exercise of stock options 
In Kedia and Philippon’s (2009) study of companies that commit financial fraud, the 
authors document an abnormally rapid exercise of in-the-money stock options by those firms’ 
managers.  The obvious interpretation of their results is that managers attempt to withdraw 
equity compensation from the company when the per-share price is inflated above its likely 
long-term value.  We investigate stock option exercises by cartel firms.  If these managers also 
exercise stock options rapidly, the motivation may be more subtle than for executives in 
companies that commit fraud.  A successful cartel may expect its stock price to rise over time, 
suggesting that the managers would be patient about withdrawing equity compensation.  
However, they may have concerns about whether the cartel can be sustained, and they may 
wish to withdraw their compensation before regulators discover the scheme.  In addition, rapid 
stock option exercises may play a diversionary role, by communicating to outsiders that the 
managers do not expect future abnormal increases in the stock.  It may also serve as a 
communication device by sending signals to managers of other firms in the cartel. 
In Table 9 we present an analysis of stock option exercises by the CEO and the top five 
managers in our cartel firms and our control sample.  Our data source for option exercises is the 
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S&P ExecuComp database, and relying on this database greatly reduces our sample size since it 
covers only about one-quarter of the companies on Compustat.  Our regressions follow those 
reported by Kedia and Philippon (2009).  We use two dependent variables: (i) the dollar value 
of option profits realized by managers, divided by the total amount by which options are in-the-
money (their intrinsic value) at the start of the year, and (ii) a more simple calculation of the 
ratio between number of options exercised and the number that are vested and could 
theoretically have been exercised, whether in-the-money or not.  Control variables include the 
size of the firm’s total inventory of outstanding employee stock options, the exercise rate for all 
firms in the two-digit SIC industry, Tobin’s Q, and the firm’s stock return in the past year, 
along with fixed effects for year and industry. 
 Results of these estimations appear in Table 9.  In every model estimates indicate that 
managers from cartel firms exercise their stock options more rapidly than managers from firms 
in the control sample, although the estimate in the right column just misses statistical 
significance at the 10 percent level.  As noted above, these patterns of early option exercise 
could occur for a number of reasons, but they are consistent with an interpretation that 
managers wish to withdraw their equity compensation before some future date at which the 
cartel might be exposed and the firm’s stock price could drop. 
 
3.7 Securities fraud litigation 
We use the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action database to identify companies 
accused of financial fraud in class action civil litigation brought by shareholders.  Ultimately 60 
of our 216 cartel firms are sued for securities fraud one or more times during the sample period, 
which does not begin until 1996, the starting date of the Stanford database.  When scaled by the 
number of observations in the sample, the lawsuit frequency for the cartel firms exceeds 5 
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percent per year, almost three times higher than the frequency for companies in the control 
sample, as shown by the sample means reported in Table 1. 
 In Table 10 we present regression analysis of the incidence of securities fraud lawsuits.  
A binary probit model appears in the left column, with the dependent variable equal to one if 
the firm is sued in a given year.  A Poisson maximum likelihood model in the right column is 
based on the number of lawsuits filed per year.  As in our other regressions, control variables 
include firm size, ROA, and fixed effects for years and industries.  We obtain strongly positive 
and significant estimates for the cartel indicator variable, confirming the result that these firms 
attract shareholder litigation for fraud at unusually high frequencies. 
We reviewed many of the cases in the Stanford database and found that price fixing is 
rarely, if ever, the basis of shareholders’ complaints.  Cartel membership is not by itself an act 
of fraud, and shareholders may have difficulty arguing that they sustain damages when a firm 
successfully conspires to fix prices.  Instead, the shareholder litigation may be a byproduct of 
the other signal-jamming strategies related to financial reporting that are illuminated by the 
regression results above, such as frequent earnings restatements, segment reclassifications, or 
abnormally high discretionary accruals. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We study the behavior of 216 U.S. public companies that are accused by governments of 
illegal cartel activity.  We find that the sample firms engage in a range of practices designed to 
obscure their behavior from both internal and external audiences.  Compared to a control 
sample of firms with similar size and industry, cartel firms appear to avoid new outside 
monitoring by not replacing board members who resign and changing auditors infrequently.  
When new directors are appointed, they tend to be busy or foreign-based directors who are 
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known to be inferior monitors.  In financial reporting, cartel firms engage in unusually high 
levels of earnings smoothing and file high numbers of financial restatements for the cartel 
years.  They also frequently reclassify their industrial segments year-to-year when reporting 
line-of-business data in annual financial statements, making annual comparisons of financial 
results more difficult.  Top managers of cartel firms exercise stock options more frequently 
than executives in the control sample, perhaps attempting to withdraw their equity 
compensation before the cartel is exposed and the firm’s stock price falls.  Cartel firms are also 
sued at high rates for securities fraud, although this litigation is rarely connected to the price-
fixing activity itself. 
We believe our results create a template for understanding how companies behave when 
they wish to conceal aspects of their financial performance.  The firms in our sample engage in 
a range of signal-jamming strategies when preparing their annual financial statements, and they 
appear to avoid inviting scrutiny from new directors or new auditors.  Managers try to cash out 
their performance-based compensation earlier than would be expected.  Multiple explanations 
may apply to some of our results.  For example, earnings smoothing or a certain timing of the 
exercise of stock options may be a communication device to other firms in a cartel. 
Our results may extend to other situations, both benign and malign, in which companies 
actively try to conceal information from their own monitors and from outside audiences.  Firms 
may not want to give clear pictures of their capital investment or new product development 
spending, for instance, and may seek to obscure unusual spending patterns through strategies 
such as segment reclassification or earnings smoothing.  More concerning would be cases in 
which managers scheme to embezzle funds or mislead creditors about the firm’s financial 
health.  By understanding the playbook of strategies outline in this paper, these and other 
problems might become apparent earlier to shareholders, analysts, and regulators. 
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Table 1 
The table shows descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,561 annual observations for 216 cartel participants and a control sample of 53,418 
observations for 3,511 Compustat firms matched on size and industry.  Cartel firms are identified from the dataset of Connor (2010).  
Board of directors data is tabulated from the RiskMetrics Directors database, and busy independent directors are those serving on three of 
more boards.  Foreign independent directors are identified from the sample of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2012).  Financial statement data is 
obtained from Compustat, which is also used to identify auditor changes.  Stock option exercise data is obtained from ExecuComp, 
securities fraud lawsuits are tabulated from the Stanford securities clearinghouse website, and financial restatements are reported on the 
Audit Analytics database. 
 
 
Cartel firms Control sample 
 
 
 
Board becomes smaller (indicator) 
% Directors leaving 
% Busy independent directors on board 
New appointments busy (indicator) 
At least one foreign independent director on board (indicator) 
New appointment of foreign independent directors (indicator) 
Auditor change indicator 
Value realized / intrinsic value of exercisable options (CEO) 
Option exercised / exercisable options (CEO) 
Value realized / intrinsic value of exercisable options (Top5) 
Option exercised / exercisable options (Top5) 
Restatement indicator 
Number of restatements 
Discretionary accruals (Jones) 
Discretionary accruals (Modified Jones) 
Deferred revenues 
Deferred revenue indicator 
Change in Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
Securities fraud lawsuit indicator 
Number of frauds 
Board size 
 
Mean 
0.328 
0.104 
0.418 
0.290 
0.202 
0.035 
0.033 
0.211 
0.115 
0.231 
0.122 
0.161 
0.208 
0.010 
0.003 
0.014 
0.236 
0.043 
0.052 
0.059 
11.255 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.470 
0.105 
0.230 
0.628 
0.402 
0.200 
0.178 
0.300 
0.207 
0.261 
0.162 
0.368 
0.521 
0.116 
0.128 
0.055 
0.425 
0.101 
0.222 
0.267 
2.920 
 
Obs. 
679 
760 
709 
672 
630 
606 
1,462 
916 
1,017 
969 
1,031 
907 
907 
1,279 
1,279 
691 
691 
999 
1,153 
1,153 
793 
 
Mean 
0.248 
0.089 
0.261 
0.158 
0.102 
0.017 
0.062 
0.188 
0.118 
0.226 
0.139 
0.138 
0.170 
-0.001 
-0.004 
0.083 
0.453 
0.029 
0.018 
0.018 
9.497 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.432 
0.110 
0.233 
0.434 
0.303 
0.142 
0.241 
0.295 
0.222 
0.272 
0.197 
0.345 
0.472 
0.143 
0.151 
0.258 
0.498 
0.086 
0.133 
0.138 
2.940 
 
Obs. 
8.029 
9,565 
9,610 
8,752 
7,150 
6,504 
44,716 
13,672 
15,369 
14,946 
16,072 
21,924 
21,924 
41,721 
41,713 
15,258 
15,258 
33,041 
32,528 
32,528 
11,034 
Difference 
In Means 
0.080 a  
0.015 a 
0.157 a 
0.132 a 
0.099 a 
0.017 a 
-0.029 a 
0.023 b 
-0.003  
0.005  
-0.017 a 
0.023 b 
0.038 b 
0.012 a 
0.008 c 
-0.069 a 
-0.217 a 
0.013 a 
0.034 a 
0.041 a 
1.757 a 
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% independent directors on board 
Total assets 
Market value 
Sales 
ROA (EBIT / total assets) 
Book-to-market  
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Options outstanding 
Annual return 
External financing 
Acquisitions / market capitalization 
Free Cash Flow 
Firm age 
Absolute value of change in EBIT 
CAPX / total assets 
0.709 
62,411 
27,734 
19,130 
0.095 
0.496 
1.882 
0.669 
54.862 
1.658 
0.009 
0.029 
0.027 
35.706 
1.031 
0.051 
0.155 
192,805 
56,220 
37,564 
0.079 
0.412 
1.373 
0.216 
101.196 
56.376 
0.230 
0.077 
0.198 
24.759 
9.188 
0.040 
796 
1,558 
1,459 
1,555 
1,553 
1,459 
1,461 
1,549 
944 
1,421 
814 
1,257 
1,288 
1,356 
1,508 
1,511 
0.682 
6,957 
2,810 
2,182 
0.040 
0.578 
1.996 
0.622 
13.570 
0.713 
0.013 
0.034 
0.007 
16.930 
1.870 
0.061 
0.176 
38,566 
10,591 
5,948 
0.169 
0.489 
2.331 
0.485 
50.724 
27.484 
0.229 
0.091 
0.201 
16.199 
27.768 
0.075 
11,120 
51,801 
46,147 
51,530 
50,211 
45,833 
45,885 
51,704 
17,197 
43,047 
18,204 
38,173 
33,897 
38,928 
46,665 
48,159 
0.028 a 
55,454 a 
24,924 a 
16,948 a 
0.056 a 
-0.082 a 
-0.114 c 
0.047 a 
41.290 a 
0.945  
-0.004 
-0.005 c 
0.020 a 
18.780 a 
-0.839 
-0.010 a 
 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Table 2 
Growth dynamics for cartel firms and matched sample 
The table reports OLS regression results of adjusted growth dynamics for a variety of financial 
and employment data.  The sample includes 216 U.S. firms identified by regulators as cartel 
participants between 1986-2010.  Each dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is a growth rate (one 
year log differences) relative to the mean growth rate of a control group of 3,511 Compustat 
firms matched on size and industry, and in Column 5, the dependent variable is the one-year 
difference in return on assets (ROA) relative to the mean first difference of ROA for the control 
group.  The indicator variable Before equals 1 for the two years preceding each cartel, During 
equals 1 during the cartel period, and After equals 1 for the two years after the cartel ends.  t-
statistics in parentheses are based on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich 
estimator. The table reports p-values of Wald tests for the hypotheses that βDuring equals βBefore 
and βDuring equals βAfter. 
 
 Dependent variables 
(annual growth rates): 
 
Market 
value 
 
Sales 
 
Employment 
 
PPE 
 
ROA 
Before  
(indicator for two years prior to cartel) 
                          
During  
(indicator for years in cartel period) 
                          
After 
(indicator for two years following cartel) 
                         
0.010 
(0.537) 
 
0.036 a 
(2.795) 
 
-0.032 
(-1.571) 
0.002 
(0.132) 
 
0.046 a 
(4.462) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.142) 
0.016 
(1.450) 
 
0.029 a 
(3.335) 
 
-0.010 
(-0.698) 
0.017 
(1.173) 
 
0.053 a 
(4.560) 
 
0.016 
(1.175) 
-0.002 
(-0.450) 
 
0.004 b 
(2.077) 
 
-0.005 
(-1.071) 
Observations 
r-squared 
 
Wald test: βDuring = βBefore  
Wald test: βDuring = βAfter 
3,288 
0.004 
 
0.202 
0.002 a 
3,453 
0.012 
 
0.000 a 
0.000 a 
3,316 
0.006 
 
0.291 
0.003 a 
3,383 
0.011 
 
0.010 a 
0.012 b 
3,465 
0.001 
 
0.125 
0.033 b 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Table 3 
Retention and replacement of directors 
The first two columns reports results from probit regressions in which the dependent variable 
equals 1 if board size decreases in a given year.  The right two columns report the results from 
Tobit regressions of the percentage of directors leaving the board in a given year.  The sample 
includes 216 U.S. firms identified by regulators as cartel participants between 1986-2010, as 
well as a control sample of Compustat firms matched on size and industry.  ln(board size) is the 
natural log of the number of directors on the board.  Board of directors data is obtained from 
the RiskMetrics Directors database.  Tobin’s Q is defined as total assets minus the book value 
of equity plus the market value of equity over total assets.  Past growth in ROA is the three-
year growth rate in return on assets. SOX is an indicator variable which equals for the years 
after enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002 and after).  z-statistics and t-statistics appear 
in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Board becomes smaller 
(Probit) 
Percentage of directors 
leaving (Tobit) 
Cartel firm indicator 
 
 
ln(board size) 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Past growth in ROA 
 
 
SOX 
 
                          
0.293 a 
(5.189) 
 
-0.306 a 
(-5.099) 
 
-0.030 a 
(-2.784) 
 
5.323 b 
(2.261) 
0.304 a 
(5.432) 
 
-0.307 a 
(-5.154) 
 
-0.029 a 
(-2.762) 
 
5.486 b 
(2.280) 
 
-0.060 b 
(-1.966) 
0.016 b 
(2.087) 
 
0.116 a 
(15.071) 
 
-0.008 a 
(-6.026) 
 
0.043 
(0.542) 
0.023 a 
(3.027) 
 
0.110 a 
(14.356) 
 
-0.007 a 
(-5.313) 
 
0.047 
(0.594) 
 
-0.007 c 
(-1.859) 
Year fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects 
Observations 
Pseudo r-squared 
LR Chi-squared 
Prob > Chi-squared 
 
Yes 
Yes 
8,504 
0.025 
  
No 
Yes 
8,504 
0.023 
Yes 
Yes 
10,046 
 
577.16 
0.000 
No 
Yes 
10,046 
 
397.00 
0.000 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Table 4 
Busy and foreign outside directors 
The table shows regression estimates of models of the presence and appointment of busy and 
foreign outside directors to the board.  The sample includes 216 U.S. firms identified by 
regulators as cartel participants between 1986-2010, as well as a control sample of Compustat 
firms matched on size and industry.  Busy directors are defined as those holding three or more 
board seats.  Data on foreign outside directors is obtained from Masulis et. al (2012).  Other 
board of directors data is obtained from the RiskMetrics Directors database.  ln(board size) is 
the natural log of the number of directors on the board.  z-statistics and t-statistics appear in 
parentheses. 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Busy outside directors Foreign outside directors 
 
Percentage 
on board 
(Tobit) 
New 
appointments 
(Poisson) 
At least one 
on board 
(Probit) 
New 
appointments 
(Poisson) 
 
Cartel firm indicator 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
ln(board size) 
 
 
% Independent directors 
                          
0.138 a 
(11.603) 
 
-0.028 
(-0.917) 
 
0.256 a 
(21.642) 
 
0.438 a 
(21.858) 
0.319 a 
(3.903) 
 
-0.061 
(-0.204) 
 
1.535 a 
(14.196) 
 
2.158 a 
(11.367) 
0.149 b 
(2.223) 
 
-0.220 
(-1.054) 
 
0.991 a 
(12.340) 
 
1.118 a 
(8.512) 
0.227 
(0.898) 
 
0.041 
(0.042) 
 
1.865 a 
(5.112) 
 
1.636 a 
(2.818) 
Year fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects 
Observations 
Pseudo r-squared 
LR Chi-squared 
Prob > Chi-squared 
 
Yes 
Yes 
10,125 
 
1638.66 
 0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
9,258 
0.056 
Yes 
Yes 
7,698 
0.086 
Yes 
Yes 
7,035 
0.063 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Table 5 
Changes in auditors 
The table reports the results from probit regressions of a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
the firm changes auditors in a given year.  The sample includes 216 U.S. firms identified by 
regulators as cartel participants between 1986-2010, as well as a control sample of Compustat 
firms matched on size and industry.  Auditor changes are identified from Compustat.  
Regressions include return on assets and firm size (the log of total assets) as control variables.  
z-statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Company changes auditor 
 
Cartel firm indicator 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
ln(Total assets)                     
 
                          
-0.183 a 
(-2.712) 
 
-0.183 a 
(-3.219) 
 
-0.050 a 
(-9.708) 
-0.133 c 
(-1.864) 
 
-0.117 c 
(-1.922) 
 
-0.082 a 
(-12.525) 
Year fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects 
Observations 
Pseudo r-squared 
Yes 
No 
45,626 
0.045 
Yes 
Yes 
45,626 
0.057 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Table 6 
Restatements 
The table reports probit regression estimates for whether a firm restates its audited 
financial statements in a given year and Poisson regression estimates of the number of 
restatements per year. The sample includes 216 U.S. firms identified by regulators as 
cartel participants between 1986-2010, as well as a control sample of Compustat firms 
matched on size and industry.  Regressions include control variables for the book-to-
market ratio (lagged), the natural logarithm of market capitalization (lagged), external 
financing, acquisitions scaled by market capitalization, and free cash flow.  Data for 
restatements is obtained from the Audit Analytics database, which covers restatements 
disclosed since January 1, 2001, and due to the coverage of this database we use 
observations only for the years 2000-2010.  All control variables are defined as in 
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).  z-statistics appear in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
 
 
Restatements 
 
(Probit) 
Number of times 
restated 
(Poisson) 
Cartel firm indicator 
 
 
Book-to-market ratio (lagged) 
 
 
Ln(market capitalization) (lagged) 
 
 
External financing 
 
 
Acquisitions / market capitalization 
 
 
Free Cash Flow 
                          
 
0.208 b 
(2.533) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.228) 
 
-0.012 
(-1.239) 
 
-0.060 
(-0.667) 
 
0.123 
(0.498) 
 
-0.048 
(-0.506) 
0.171 c 
(1.948) 
 
0.073 c 
(1.678) 
 
0.001 
(0.083) 
 
-0.114 
(-1.171) 
 
0.037 
(0.140) 
 
-0.158 
(-1.552) 
0.312 a 
(2.555) 
 
0.030 
(0.508) 
 
0.001 
(0.094) 
 
-0.083 
(-0.592) 
 
0.320 
(0.837) 
 
-0.080 
(-0.537) 
0.190 
(1.488) 
 
0.178 a 
(2.609) 
 
0.042 b 
(2.293) 
 
-0.148 
(-0.944) 
 
0.205 
(0.509) 
 
-0.204 
(-1.284) 
Year fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects 
Observations 
Pseudo r-squared 
 
No 
No 
8,141 
0.001 
Yes 
Yes 
8,103 
0.060 
No 
No 
8,141 
0.001 
Yes 
Yes 
8,141 
0.064 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
32 
 
Table 7 
Earnings management 
The table reports ordinary least squares regression estimates of discretionary accruals and revenue 
recognition.  The sample includes 216 U.S. firms identified by regulators as cartel participants 
between 1986-2010, as well as a control sample of Compustat firms matched on size and 
industry.  Following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Klein (2002), the discretionary 
accruals are constructed according to the cross-sectional Jones (Column 1) and the cross-sectional 
modified Jones models (Column 2).  The measure of deferred revenue is the ratio of Compustat 
items DRC+DRLT divided by net sales.  DRC is revenue which has not yet been earned, but is 
expected to be classified as earned during the current year, while DRLT is revenue which has not 
yet been earned.  The model in the fourth column uses a binary dependent variable that equals 1 if 
the sum of the sum of DRC+DRLT is greater than zero.  Regressions include controls for firm 
size (the log of total assets), leverage lagged by one year, the log of firm age, Tobin’s Q, and the 
absolute value of the change in earnings before interest and taxes over total assets.  t-statistics 
appear in parentheses and in the first two columns are based on the cluster-robust variant of the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator. 
 
Dependent variable: Discretionary 
accruals 
(Jones) 
 
(OLS) 
Discretionary 
accruals 
(Modified 
Jones) 
(OLS) 
Deferred 
revenue 
 
 
(Tobit) 
Revenue 
indicator 
 
 
(Probit) 
Cartel firm indicator 
 
 
ln(total assets) 
 
 
Leverage 
 
 
ln(firm age) 
 
 
Tobin's Q 
 
 
Absolute value of change in EBIT 
 
0.012 a 
(3.528) 
 
-0.002 a 
(-2.988) 
 
0.009 b 
(2.199) 
 
0.004 a 
(4.432) 
 
-0.003 a 
(-4.141) 
 
-0.053 b 
(-2.302) 
0.008 b 
(2.242) 
 
-0.002 a 
(-2.696) 
 
0.006 
(1.380) 
 
0.002 c 
(1.870) 
 
-0.001 a 
(-4.141) 
 
-0.060 b 
(-2.400) 
-0.125 a 
(-5.291) 
 
-0.015 a 
(-5.669) 
 
-0.012 
(-1.119) 
 
-0.053 a 
(-11.371) 
 
0.029 a 
(12.374) 
 
0.014 
(0.196) 
-0.438 a 
(-6.381) 
 
0.012 
(1.419) 
 
-0.295 a 
(-6.952) 
 
-0.120 a 
(-8.289) 
 
0.112 a 
(12.489) 
 
0.619 
(1.429) 
Year fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects 
Observations 
r-squared 
Pseudo r-squared 
LR Chi-squared 
Prob > Chi-squared 
Yes 
Yes 
30,975 
0.015 
Yes 
Yes 
30,969 
0.011 
Yes 
Yes 
12,373 
 
 
2911.46 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
12,208 
 
0.084 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Table 8 
Change in Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
The table reports the results from tobit regressions of the absolute value of the annual 
change in the intra-firm Herfindahl Hirschman Index based on total assets.  The sample 
includes 216 U.S. firms identified by regulators as cartel participants between 1986-2010, 
as well as a control sample of Compustat firms matched on size and industry.  The index 
is calculated from annual industry segment data reported by each company.  t-statistics 
appear in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: Change in HHI 
(total assets) 
 
Cartel firm indicator 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
CAPX / total assets 
 
 
ln(Total assets) 
 
 
0.012 a 
(2.674) 
 
0.026 a 
(5.031) 
 
-0.122 a 
(-9.886) 
 
0.013 a 
(28.024) 
0.011 b 
(2.308) 
 
0.015 a 
(2.801) 
 
-0.158 a 
(-11.361) 
 
0.013 a 
(23.576) 
Year fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects 
Observations 
LR Chi-squared 
Prob > Chi-squared 
 
Yes 
No 
33,303 
1,775.22 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
33,313 
2,574.91 
0.000 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Table 9 
Stock option exercises by top executives 
The table reports Tobit regression estimates for the value realized from options exercised over the intrinsic value of exercisable 
options (Columns 1 and 3) and the number of options exercised over total exercisable options (Columns 2 and 4).  In the right 
two columns, the dependent variables are calculated as the mean within the group of top five executives for each company.  The 
sample includes 216 U.S. firms identified by regulators as cartel participants between 1986-2010, as well as a control sample of 
Compustat firms matched on size and industry.  Option exercise data is obtained from ExecuComp, while information about the 
inventory and value of exercisable options is obtained from Compustat.  Regressions include control variables for options 
outstanding, past stock performance, Tobin’s Q and average industry exercises, which is calculated as the average value of the 
dependent variable for all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry with data on ExecuComp in that year. All control variables 
are lagged by one year. All regressions include year fixed effects.  t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
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Dependent variable: 
CEO only Top 5 executives 
Value realized /  
intrinsic value of 
exercisable options 
Options exercised / 
exercisable options 
Value realized /  
intrinsic value of 
exercisable options 
Options exercised / 
exercisable options 
Cartel firm indicator 
 
 
Average industry exercises 
 
 
Options outstanding 
 
 
Past year returns 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
0.108 a 
(4.315) 
 
0.159 
(1.333) 
 
0.071 
(0.756) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.898) 
 
0.026 a 
(8.681) 
0.058 a 
(3.215) 
 
0.522 a 
(4.544) 
 
-0.085 
(-1.231) 
 
0.002 
(1.098) 
 
0.028 a 
(13.100) 
0.048 a 
(3.258) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.064) 
 
0.034 
(0.632) 
 
-0.002 
(-1.169) 
 
0.015 a 
(8.364) 
0.016 
(1.621) 
 
0.393 a 
(6.364) 
 
-0.121 a 
(-3.238) 
 
0.002 
(1.331) 
 
0.019 a 
(15.635) 
Year fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects 
Observations 
LR Chi-squared 
Prob > Chi-squared 
 
Yes 
Yes 
8,280 
312.34 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
9,498 
505.89 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
8,968 
541.93 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
9,737 
815.50 
0.000 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Table 10 
Securities fraud litigation 
The table reports the results from regressions for the incidence of securities fraud lawsuits 
filed during the period 1996-2010, based on the Stanford Law School Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse.  The sample includes 216 U.S. firms identified by regulators as 
cartel participants between 1986-2010, as well as a control sample of Compustat firms 
matched on size and industry.  t-statistics appear in parentheses.  
 
Dependent variable: 
 
 
 
 
Fraud 
lawsuit 
indicator 
(Probit) 
Number 
of fraud 
lawsuits 
(Poisson) 
Cartel firm indicator 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
ln(Total assets) 
 
 
0.209 a 
(2.753) 
 
-0.995 a 
(-9.965) 
 
0.168 a 
(14.166) 
0.530 a 
(3.516) 
 
-2.338 a 
(-11.247) 
 
0.372 a 
(14.602) 
Year fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects 
Observations 
Pseudo r-squared 
 
Yes 
Yes 
31,728 
0.057 
Yes 
Yes 
32,632 
0.088 
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b) and 10% (c) levels. 
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Figure 1 
Return on assets around the year of cartel formation 
The figure shows mean annual return on assets (ROA) for 216 U.S. companies 
participating in price-fixing cartels.  Year 0 represents the beginning of each cartel 
according to government antitrust regulators.  The sample is identified by Connor (2010) 
from government filings, press releases, and news reports 
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